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One of the key elements of the strategies of interest representation of strong legislative 
regions in EU policy-making is active participation in the domestic co-ordination 
processes of the member state position. One could thus expect intergovernmental 
relations in multi-level states to be subject to a Europeanization process encouraging 
cooperation and leading to centralization. However, this paper argues that cooperation 
effects can only be confirmed for the formal rules on intergovernmental cooperation, 
which do generally require more cooperation than in domestic matters. However, when 
informal practices are taken into account, some member states become more cooperative, 
others arguably less. This divergence between cases can be explained by the intricate 
circular interplay of formal and informal practices. While the informal practices of actors 
mean that domestic coordination does not follow exactly the logic of formal rules, the 
incentives provided by formal rules shape what kind of informal practices emerge. 
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One of the key elements of the strategies of interest representation of strong legislative 
regions in EU policy-making is active participation in the domestic co-ordination 
processes of the member state position. One could thus expect intergovernmental 
relations in multi-level states to be subject to a Europeanization process encouraging 
cooperation and leading to centralization. However, this paper argues that cooperation 
effects can only be confirmed for the formal rules on intergovernmental cooperation, 
which do indeed require more cooperation than in domestic matters. However, when 
informal practices are taken into account, some member states become more cooperative, 
others arguably less. Also, while centralization effects are manifest in most cases, some 
regions manage to circumvent these by means of informal coordination. This divergence 
between cases can be explained by the intricate interplay of formal and informal 
practices. On the one hand, the informal practices of actors mean that domestic 
coordination does not follow exactly the logic of formal rules. On the other hand, the 





Differences in regional participation in European policy-making start at home. Both 
scholars and policy-makers are acutely aware of the difficulties of developing theories or 
European level mechanisms of participation that fit regions of centralized and regions of 
federal states alike. It is striking, though, just how diverse the formal mechanisms for 
domestic European policy-making are for even the strongest legislative regions.  
One of the key elements of the strategies of interest representation of strong legislative 
regions in EU policy-making is active participation in the domestic co-ordination 
processes of the member state position (Jeffery, 2000). In federal and quasi-federal 
member states, regional governments are usually entitled to some involvement in the 
formulation of the member state position in EU matters. However, the formal rules  
governing this coordination process differ between member states.  
While the formal rules (e.g. constitutional or legal rules on the use of certain institutions, 
majorities etc.) are fought over in practice, both academics and practitioners alike 
acknowledge the existence of an elaborate system of informal practices (i.e. all practices 
that are not required by law) in the domestic coordination of EU matters (Kovziridze, 
2002). In fact, these informal practices are often described as eclipsing formal rules, both 
in quantitative terms (i.e. how much of the coordination process is governed by formal 
practices in relation to informal practices) and in qualitative terms (i.e. where agreement 
is reached) (ibid.; Beyers & Bursens, 2006: 1067) and in many cases they become highly 
institutionalized (i.e. take place in a certain pattern on a regular basis). 
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The objective of this article is to return to the domestic coordination processes on EU 
affairs of federal and quasi-federal states with a view to not only understanding the 
different forms of coordination in practice, but also to understand the relationship 
between formal rules and informal practices and their interplay with Europeanization. In 
particular, this article will examine the hypotheses of the theoretical framework of this 
special issue that Europeanization leads to greater centralization and more cooperative 
practices in multi-level states (cf. hypotheses 3 and 4 of the introductory article). 
However, it further argues that there is a difference between the Europeanization of 
formal rules and Europeanization of the system as a whole, including informal practices. 
It argues that the literature underestimates the importance of formal rules, because they 
are often only used to formalize, i.e. “rubber-stamp”, informal compromises in day-to-
day policy-making. The importance of formal rules lies elsewhere, namely in the 
provision of system-shaping incentives and disincentives for certain types of action. 
Thus, the hypothesis is that the extent to which cooperation takes place in practice 
depends on the weight attributed by formal rules to the collective positions of the regions 
vis-à-vis the position of the central state. 
The hypothesis will be tested in the case of EU water policy, in particular the Bathing 
Water Directive of 2006. The empirical data will be complemented, where appropriate, 
with insights from the similar case of the Flood Risk Management Directive of 2007. The 
focus thus lies on regulatory policy-making – the most common type of EU policy-
making. The country cases comprise Belgium and Scotland as examples of dual systems 
and Germany and Austria as examples of cooperative systems. The cases were 
reconstructed through process-tracing on the basis of qualitative semi-structured 
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interviews and documentary analysis of policy papers, press releases, newsletters etc (cf. 
next section). 
The following sections will first discuss the theoretical framework and research 
questions. The second section will focus on formal, written rules, arguing that in 
Europeanization has indeed a cooperation and centralization effect on formal rules. 
However, the analysis of informal practices in the third section shows that – in some 
cases – the actual coordination of the national position follows a different logic from the 
system set out in the formal rules due to the quantity and nature of the informal practices 
in that member state. The fourth section explains this variation between member states in 
informal practices with reference to the incentives and disincentives for cooperation 
provided by their respective sets of formal rules. 
 
Europeanization and Multi-Level States 
Europeanisation is a popular concept that has been applied to a wide variety of aspects of 
European integration, such as the construction of European institutions, the capacity of 
member states to shape European policies and adapt to European policies and how 
European opportunities and constraints affect national politics. It overlaps with the multi-
level governance literature where the Europeanisation of federal structures, regional 
actors or policies with regional input is concerned (e.g. Conzelmann 1998; Benz and 
Eberlein 1999; Bache 2007; Beyers and Bursens 2006). This article employs a circular 
definition of Europeanization as “a shorthand term for a complex process whereby 
national and subnational institutions, political actors, and citizens adapt to and seek to 
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shape, the trajectory of European integration in general and EU policies in particular” 
(Bomberg and Peterson 2000: 7). This definition captures the idea that domestic actors 
adapt to European developments in order to be able to influence (future) European 
developments (cf. Börzel and Risse 2000: 1; Radaelli and Pasquier 2007).  
One of the advantages of the Europeanization literature is that it focuses more on the 
interplay between subnational and national actors in EU policy-making than the multi-
level governance literature, which acknowledges this interplay but generally concentrates 
on the direct link between subnational and supranational actors. Studies of the 
transformation of the Belgian federal state and Flemish strategies in EU policy-making 
(Bursens and Deforche 2008; Beyers and Bursens 2006; Kerremans and Beyers 1997), 
for example, suggest that European integration created the need to find a common 
Belgian position in European negotiations and thus put the dual structure of the Belgian 
state under pressure. As a result, it gave rise to increasingly cooperative practices 
amongst domestic actors that normally try to avoid cooperation (cf. Beyers and Bursens 
2006). In the German case, by contrast, Knodt argues that the German Länder 
increasingly adopt individualistic strategies of interest representation in European policy-
making rather than working through the Bundesrat and the CoR (Knodt 2000: 239-40). 
These two examples already point towards the diverse impact of Europeanization even 
between federal states. 
The motivation to adapt to European developments can be explained with reference to the 
concepts of “fit” and “misfit”. Several studies show that Europeanisation does not 
automatically lead to convergence, as a number of domestic factors shape the impact of 
EU pressures (Ladrech 1994; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001). This has led to a 
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creation of typologies of member states, which is, however, disputed. According to 
Caporaso (2007, 29) the institutional ‘fit’ between federal states and the EU is greater 
than for unitary states, as the EU reflects the territorial structures of federalism better than 
the centralised policy-making systems of unitary states. Bache uses a similar typology 
informed by Schmidt’s distinction of compound systems (proportional representation 
system, corporatist policy-making processes and regionalized or federalized structures) 
and simple polities (majoritarian representation, statist policy-making, unitary state 
structure) (Schmidt 2006: 227). He argues that European cohesion policy will fit 
compound polities better than simple ones, but admits that some states do not conform to 
the typology (Germany) and that there are also variations between different regions 
within member states (Bache 2008: 63-5, 70, 154). By contrast, Börzel (1999, 577-8) 
argues that the regions of federal/regionalised states lose power due to European 
integration, which suggests that there is a misfit between federal systems and the 
pressures of European integration. She also breaks down the apparently homogeneous 
group of federal and regionalized states into two subgroups attributing to the 
cooperative/competitive political cultures an impact on the choice of strategy of regional 
interest representation.  
In line with the introduction to this special issue, this article argues that there is a misfit 
of structures between multi-level states and European integration (cf. Introductory 
article). Successive rounds of enlargement to more centralized states have increasingly 
marginalized multi-level states, while attempts to provide institutions of formal 
representation at the European level, such as the Committee of the Regions, were 
unsuccessful. Participation in the coordination of the national position is still one of the 
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most important channels of influence. However, formal rules on regional participation in 
the formulation of national positions vary between member states. This raises a number 
of questions: What is the impact of Europeanization on domestic inter-governmental 
coordination and to what extent does it differ between member states? What is the role of 
formal rules on intergovernmental cooperation in shaping the outcome of 
Europeanization (if any)?  
As regional governments still lack formal powers individually at the European level, the 
expectation is that they will try to exercise formal powers through the national position 
and thus the central state. In order to do that, they need to coordinate with other actors 
within the member state. Thus, following the theoretical framework of this special issue, 
the first hypothesis is thus that Europeanization leads to greater centralization and more 
cooperative practices in multi-level states. This impact is likely to be more noticeable in 
the case of dual or competitive multi-level systems, due to their different starting point. 
(cf. hypotheses 3 and 4 of the introductory article). Federalism or decentralization that 
follows the ‘dual’ model is characterized by an attempt to constitutionally separate 
policy-making powers between different levels by allocating the actors exclusive 
competences as far as possible. By contrast, ‘cooperative’ systems are characterized by 
shared competences between the centre and the regions and thus joint decision-making 
and/or situations where one level implements the decisions of another level. 
In addition, formal rules on intergovernmental coordination are expected to act as an 
intervening variable. The hypothesis is that some sets of rules provide regions with more 
control of the national position than others, so that the incentives to cooperate with the 
central government and/or other regions are stronger in some member states than in 
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others. Therefore, the second hypothesis is that the extent to which cooperative practices 
develop depends on the weight attributed by formal rules to the positions of the regions 
and on barriers (e.g. consensus requirements) to cooperation. 
Formal rules will refer to all legal or constitutional requirements governing 
intergovernmental cooperation in EU affairs, whereas informal practices refer to all other 
activities and institutions that are not prescribed by law. Formal and institutionalized 
should not be confused. The degree of institutionalization refers to the extent to which 
something has become a well-established, regular practice. Practices governed by formal 
rules will usually be highly institutionalized because they are required to take place (e.g. 
the formulation of a Bundesrat position in Germany). However, informal practices are not 
necessarily ad hoc. They can be ad hoc, such as spontaneous phone calls to request 
feedback or information, but they can also become highly institutionalized if they are 
seen to work well. For example, the discussion of EU affairs at interministerial 
conferences in Germany is not a formal requirement, but it has become a highly 
institutionalized practice. 
Empirically, these hypotheses will be tested against the cases of Germany, Austria, 
Belgium and coordination between the UK and Scotland in the case of Directive 
2006/7/EC concerning the management of bathing water quality (hereafter: Bathing 
Water Directive). The four country cases were selected on the basis that they represent a 
set of two cooperative systems (Germany and Austria) and two dual systems (Belgium 
and the UK). Data was collected on seven regions (Scotland, Carinthia, Vorarlberg, 
Mecklenburg West-Pomerania, Bavaria, Wallonia and Flanders) that were all affected by 
the policy problems and thus had a reason to mobilize. The role of the policy in the 
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research was to provide a means to reconstruct concrete processes of coordination and to 
avoid relying on vague claims about “frequent” or “rare” interactions with this or that 
actor. A series of qualitative interviews and documentary analysis were used to 
reconstruct the process of coordination of the national positions. In some cases, 
interviews in relation to the Flood Risk Management Directive will be included to 
corroborate the analysis. Generally, the process of negotiation of that Directive was very 
similar, but could not be included here for reasons of space. Interviews on flood risk 
management will be indicated with as ‘Interview F …’. 
The logic behind the choice of the Bathing Water Directive was to find a “good case” that 
would affect all case study regions and thus lead to interest and mobilization in the 
regional government and that would be fairly representative of “normal” domestic 
coordination. As the Bathing Water Directive does not involve direct funding or raise 
issues of sovereignty (Bathing Water had already been regulated in an old Directive), it is 
not an exceptional “ideal” case. But what makes it a representative “good” case is that it 
nevertheless affects the regions in their legislative powers.1 In addition, all regions are 
affected by the policy problem: all have a number of bathing waters. In all cases, the 
media reported on the quality of national bathing water with reference to the European 
legislative framework. In all cases bathing water was salient for reasons of tourism and/or 
due to extensive problems and media reports. Finally, during the negotiations the 
inclusion of all water sport (e.g. surfing or kayaking) was considered, which led to 
considerable protests, as this could have led to a restriction of the exercise of water sport 
during certain months (cf. █████ for a detailed discussion). 
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Formal Coordination: Differing Frameworks for Regional Involvement 
across Member States 
All multi-level member states recognize the right of their regions to be involved in the 
coordination of the national position on EU affairs. However, the precise modalities of 
regional involvement differ hugely across member states, as formal rules are in line with 
the organizational logic of the member state (i.e. the dual or cooperative nature of the 
federal state) and reflect the strength of the region in domestic policy-making more 
generally (i.e. whether regions have a large number of exclusive competences, how 
strong they are in areas of shared competences and where sovereignty is seen to lie). 
Based on the hypotheses, two dimensions are particularly important for the analysis of 
formal rules on domestic cooperation on EU affairs: the extent to which regions are 
required or encouraged to cooperate with the other regions of the member state 
(horizontal cooperation) and the degree of influence they have over the member state 
position. It should be noted that both dimensions are evaluated purely with regard to the 
formal rules here. The cases of Germany, Austria, Belgium and the UK illustrate the 
diverse logics at work (cf. Figure 1 here). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
In Germany, the formal mechanisms of coordination in European matters are laid down 
in Art. 23 of the Basic Law (BL) and the Law on Cooperation (LC) between the Bund 
and the Länder Concerning European Matters of 12 March 1993. The coordination takes 
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place between the federal government and the collective position of the Länder as 
expressed in the Bundesrat through a majority vote. As a result, individual Länder 
governments do not enjoy equal status to the federal government in the process 
(Kovziridze, 2002: 140), as the Länder are only empowered collectively.  
If the European measure predominantly concerns the legislative and administrative 
competences of the Länder, the position of the Bundesrat has to be decisively taken into 
account (“massgeblich zu berücksichtigen”) without prejudicing the federal responsibility 
for the Republic. This was the case for the Bathing Water Directive, where three 
positions were adopted. For legislative projects that touch upon predominantly federal 
competences, the Bundesrat position merely has to be taken into account. The same 
applies if the project affects concurrent federal-regional competences when the federal 
government has already previously legislated in the area (see Kovziridze, 2002; Müller-
Graff, 2005; Art.23 BL and §5(2) LC). On the whole, the level of influence of the 
German Laender according to the formal rules is high when their competences are 
predominantly concerned – as in the case of bathing water – but consultative when they 
are not. 
In Austria, the Länder can also only exercise influence collectively. In cases of European 
legislation that affects their exclusive competences, the Länder can adopt a ‘unified 
position’ that binds the federal government except if there are compelling reasons of 
integration or foreign policy that require adaptation (see Art. 23d of the federal 
constitution and the Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund und den Ländern gemäss Art. 15a 
B-VG über die Mitwirkungsrechte der Länder und Gemeinden in Angelegenheiten der 
europäischen Integration, 1992). As the definition of this exception is rather vague, the 
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federal government has some leeway in practice. Unified positions have to be adopted by 
a majority of Länder (at least five) with no opposition from the remaining Länder. 
According to the Vereinbarung zwischen den Ländern gemäß Art. 15 a B-VG über die 
gemeinsame Willensbildung der Länder in Angelegenheiten der europäischen 
Integration, the Integration Conference of the Länder, consisting of the 
Landeshauptmänner and the Presidents of the parliaments of the Länder, is responsible 
for the horizontal coordination. In reality, there is considerable flexibility in the 
interpretation of these rules and the Integration Conference only plays a minor role as the 
unified position of the Länder tends to be elaborated by the Landeshauptleutekonferenz 
or the experts of the Länder (Bussjaeger & Djanani, 2009: 60).  
As the Austrian Länder have only few exclusive competences, only 75 unified positions 
were adopted between 1993 and 2008, an average of about five a year (Bussjaeger, Bär, 
& Willi, 2006: 61; Bussjaeger & Djanani, 2009: 42, 75).  In all other policy areas – 
including the case of bathing water – the Länder can adopt ‘simple positions’ individually 
or coordinate horizontally to achieve a common position. A number of simple positions 
were adopted by various Länder including the two case study regions on the Bathing 
Water Directive. These positions are, however, non-binding. Overall, the Austrian Länder 
thus have a weak position in the internal coordination mechanisms for European policy-
making due to the obligation for consensual agreement (Morass, 1997: 81-2) and the 
limited number of exclusive regional competences where binding positions can be 
reached.  
Because of their domestic strength, the Belgian regions have obtained the status of “veto 
players” and enjoy by far the highest level of influence over the coordination of the 
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national position (Lambertz & Foerster, 2009: 24). The central coordinating role for 
Belgium’s official position in the European Union is played by the Directorate for 
European Affairs of the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (DEA). It is an 
administrative body composed of representatives of the federal, regional and community 
ministries and headed by a federal representative. Decisions are taken by consensus, 
which confers an equal status on the regions, communities and the central government 
(Kerremans & Beyers, 1997: 50). The federal level can at best achieve a slight degree of 
primacy through the use of its monitoring and coordinating role (Kovziridze, 2002: 138). 
This is also the procedure used for the Bathing Water Directive. 
In the absence of consensus, ministers from the different levels will discuss the issue in 
the Interministerial Conference for Foreign Policy. If no common position can be found, 
the Prime Minister and regional and community minister-presidents will meet in the 
Consultation Committee. In practice, the DEA reaches agreement on the vast majority of 
issues (138). 
In the UK, despite a high level of devolution with regard to domestic policy-making, the 
negotiation of EU legislation is a “reserved matter” under the 1998 Scotland Act. The 
central government is thus only obliged to consult the devolved governments and remains 
firmly at the heart of the process. In addition, intergovernmental relations for the purpose 
of defining Britain’s position on EU policies have generally been characterised by a 
much lower degree of formalisation than in the other three member states (Cairney, 2006: 
439). 
Intergovernmental relations between Scotland and the UK are governed by a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a series of concordats on specific 
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mechanisms or policy areas, such as the Concordat on the Coordination of European 
Union Policy Issues and the Concordat between the Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions and the Scottish government. These Concordats are non-
binding agreements between the UK government and devolved governments and support 
administrative practices (Lynch, 2001: 150). Labour governments both at the centre and 
in Scotland initially further reduced the need for formal mechanisms, as Labour felt 
compelled to make the policy of devolution work and as intra-party politics could resolve 
many issues (Laffin, Shaw, & Taylor, 2007; Swenden, 2009). On the whole, the absence 
of formal and binding rules results in the devolved governments having no “hard” powers 
in domestic EU policy-making. 
The main mechanism of internal conflict resolution specified in the MoU and the 
Concordats are Joint Ministerial Committees (JMC), which can be used to coordinate 
both devolved and non-devolved matters. Meeting about two to four times a year, the 
JMC on European affairs has played some role in the discussion of the UK’s broad 
strategy on European matters (MacPhail, 2008: 21). In the absence of formal channels 
other than the JMC, the coordination of the Bathing Water Directive took in practice 
place through informal channels (see below). 
Overall, those member states that have divided competences according to a dual model 
have also opted for a model of domestic European policy-making where each region is 
being consulted individually, which limits the level of horizontal cooperation but still 
implies a degree of centralization and somewhat more cooperation than in purely 
domestic policy-making. Those states that follow a model of cooperative federalism have 
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again adopted a model of coordination where the regions have collective influence and 
that mirrors the practices in place in domestic policy-making more generally. 
 
Cooperative Trends through Informal Practices? 
The formal rules on intergovernmental coordination of national positions tell only part of 
the story, as they are complemented and, arguably, eclipsed by a dense net of informal 
practices and institutions in every day policy-making. In some cases, such as the United 
Kingdom, the prevalence of informal practices is unsurprising, as formal rules are vague. 
But even in Belgium and Germany, where the rules on coordination are clear, 
coordination is largely achieved through informal exchanges. As the precise nature of 
informal arrangements varies somewhat from policy area to policy area, the informal 
mechanisms are, in the following, illustrated through the examples of EU bathing water 
policy. The case affected the regions in their implementation powers and legislative 
powers, with the exception of the Austrian Länder (which have few legislative powers). It 
is argued that informal practices modify the cooperation and centralization effect of 
Europeanization. 
 
Germany: The Collective Reflex 
In Germany, in the early stages of the negotiation of the Bathing Water Directive, the 
Bundesrat adopted three Decisions on bathing water and decided on the common 
representative in the German delegations to Commission and Council working groups 
(Bundesrat, Press Release No. 19/2002, 1/02/2002; Bundesrat, Beschluss No. 49/02, 
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1/02/2002; Bundesrat, Beschluss No. 857/02, 14/02/2003). Normally, internal agreement 
on this question is in practice reached at the level of secretaries of state and ministers, 
before it is formalised in the Bundesrat (Interview F representative of the Bundesrat 
7/04/2009), but for the Bathing Water Directive, an official from Schleswig-Holstein had 
acted as representative of the Bundesrat since 1992 or 1993, when he witnessed the 
failure of the first attempt to revise the old Directive (Interview Representative of the 
Bundesrat 24/04/2009). Also, most of the coordination on the policy de facto took place 
in informal but highly institutionalised arrangements. Thus, the Umweltministerkonferenz 
(Conference of the Ministers of the Environment) is used to reach political agreement on 
the highest political level. Despite its lack of formal status, it has reached a high degree of 
institutionalisation in domestic policy-making and is supported by an array of committees 
that help to prepare agreements before Bundesrat proceedings and react to European 
developments (www.umweltministerkonferenz.de; cf. Palmer 2004: 57).  
The day-to-day substantive coordination took place within the Bund-Länder working 
group on bathing water (BLAK-bathing water), which met two to three times a year and 
was attended by Länder experts and chaired by the representative of the Bundesrat 
(Interviews official (2) Bavarian Ministry of the Environment and Health 4/03/2009; 
official (1) Federal Ministry of the Environment 20/03/2009; official (2), Federal 
Ministry of the Environment 20/03/2009; Interview Representative of the Bundesrat 
24/04/2009). It reported to the LAWA (Länder Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser – Länder 
Working Group on Water), which consists of the Heads of Departments of the highest 
Länder administrations for water management. The LAWA meets twice a year before the 
meetings of the Conference of Heads of Departments (ACK) and the Conference of 
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Ministers of the Environment (UMK), to which it reports 
(www.umweltministerkonferenz.de/Arbeitsgremien.html, www. lawa.de).  
In addition, there were frequent email exchanges, usually initiated by the federal expert 
responsible for the German position in the EU. During these exchanges, the Länder had 
the opportunity to react to developments in Brussels and raise concerns (Interview 
official (1) Federal Ministry of the Environment 20/03/2009). 
At the transposition and implementation stage, the same mechanisms prevailed as at the 
negotiation stage. Thus, the task of transposing the Bathing Water Directive was 
addressed collectively in working groups that created, for example, a blueprint document 
for the transposition, a document on information policy and a recommendation on how to 
tackle the bathing water profiles (Interviews official (2) Bavarian Ministry of the 
Environment and Health 4/03/2009; official, Ministry of Social Affairs of Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania, 18/03/2009). 
On the whole, the informal practices support the collective approach of the formal 
coordination processes. With a tradition of decade-long cooperation in the field of water 
policy, the Länder voluntarily exchange information and coordinate. In this case, 
Europeanization confirms preexisting cooperative tendencies.  
 
Austria: Collective or Bilateral Coordination? 
The Austrian Länder have only limited competences in the area of water policy. As a 
result, the Austrian Länder could at best pass a consultative common position, which they 
did not do. Instead they relied on individual positions alone. This is not unusual. When no 
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binding unified position can be passed, the Laender often avoid the effort of agreeing on 
a joint position (Interviews official, Amt der Vorarlberger Landesregierung 26/03/2009; 
official, Liaison Office of the Austrian Länder 2/04/2009).  
In the case of the Bathing Water Directive, there was thus a juxtaposition of bilateral and 
collective elements. The two main coordination instruments between regions and 
between regions and the federal level were the Liaison Office of the Austrian Länder and 
the common representative of the Länder. The Liaison Office of the Austrian Länder was 
mainly involved as a hub for information exchange between regions and between the 
federal level and regions and as a coordinator of the nomination process for the common 
representative of the Länder (Interviews Federal Ministry of Health 3/04/2009; official, 
Liaison Office of the Austrian Länder 2/04/2009; F official, Amt der Kärntener 
Landesregierung Abt. 18 30/03/2009, also Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund und den 
Ländern gemäß Art. 15a B-VG über die Mitwirkungsrechte der Länder und Gemeinden 
in Angelegenheiten der europäischen Integration). In the absence of a common position, 
the Liaison Office circulates position papers from individual regions for comment by 
other regions (Interview 1). However, the other Länder often do not react to individual 
positions (Interviews official, Amt der Vorarlberger Landesregierung 26/03/2009; 
official, Liaison Office of the Austrian Länder 2/04/2009; also F official, Amt der 
Kärntener Landesregierung Abt. 18 30/03/2009). The absence of a unified or common 
position thus weakens the collective reflexes of the coordination system. 
In addition, Länder sometimes send their positions directly to the lead ministry. In that 
case, the positions may not get circulated to the other Länder. Thus, the Austrian national 
expert on bathing water recalled initially receiving positions from all Länder, but the 
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interviewee from Vorarlberg only found a few Länder positions on file (Interviews 
official, Amt der Vorarlberger Landesregierung 26/03/2009; official, Liaison Office of 
the Austrian Länder 2/04/2009, ). 
The second main task of the Liaison Office is to coordinate the nomination process of the 
common representatives of the Länder (Interviews official, Liaison Office of the Austrian 
Länder 2/04/2009; 12, also F official, Amt der Kärntener Landesregierung Abt. 18 
30/03/2009; official, Federal Ministry of Health 3/04/2009). Once the Länder agreed 
upon a common representative, she took over the coordination process during the 
negotiation, transposition and implementation of the Directive and represented the 
Laender vis-à-vis the federal ministry. However, as the preparatory meetings of the 
Federal Ministry of the Environment for upcoming Council meetings cover a variety of 
issues, Länder experts with their focus on specific dossiers are usually not invited. The 
role of the Liaison Office is then to represent and inform the Länder (Interview Liaison 
Office, 2/04/2009).  
Overall, the case of the Bathing Water Directive relied greatly on the coordination 
through the common representative and Liaison Office. Unlike in Germany, there were 
no regular working groups at the negotiation stage or at the implementation stage 
(Interviews Austrian Federal Ministry of Health, 3/04/2009; F Amt der Kärntener 
Landesregierung, Abteilung 18, 30/03/2009; Amt der Kärntener Landesregierung, 
Abteilung 15, 30/03/2009). At the implementation stage, the federal level prepared the 
transposition and then presented the drafts to the Länder for comments (Interviews 
Austrian Federal Ministry of Health, 3/04/2009; ). 
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Overall, when the Austrian Länder adopt a unified or common position, the Austrian 
logic of coordination is similar to the German one. There are two steps, coordination 
between Länder and negotiation between the Länder and the federal government and 
there is a common representative who represents the Länder position vis-à-vis the federal 
government. However, when the Länder do not have the option of a binding unified 
position, they often do not agree a formal common position at all. In that case, especially 
during the important early stages, the coordination process consists of bilateral 
consultation. The result is a further increase in the power of the center and a decrease in 
the level of cooperation. 
 
Belgium: Competition and Cooperation 
The coordination of the Belgian position on the Bathing Water Directive took place 
mostly on the regional level, with Flanders and Wallonia being particularly active for 
reasons of policy salience. The level of cooperation between the regions prior to the 
European plans for the Directive was very limited and contacts between experts were 
rare, despite the fact that an ‘old’ Directive was already in place (Interviews DGARNE 
20/05/2009; VMM 8/06/2009; F VMM, 18/05/2009).  
Since its Council presidency in 2001, Belgium has coordinated its position on 
environmental matters through “pilots”. Pilots are a regional or federal expert in charge 
of coordinating the Belgian position on a specific dossier (De Baere 2004). As the 
Bathing Water Directive fell into exclusive regional competences, the pilot was a 
regional expert from Flanders. Pilots are identified in the CCIM, the Cooperation 
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Committee for International Environmental Policies, which is chaired by the national 
minister and attended by the three regional ministers and heads of administration in the 
case of exclusive regional competences (CCPIE Groupe Directeur Eau, 23/03/2009). The 
decision on the pilots is reached by consensus (Interview Belgian Permanent 
Representation 27/05/2009).  
According to the interviewees, the Belgian position on the Directive was virtually 
exclusively agreed between the regions, as the national level had no competences 
(Interviews DGARNE 20/05/2009; VMM 8/06/2009; Belgian Permanent Representation 
27/05/2009). Coordination between regions was mostly done via email and in meetings, 
with most meetings taking place in Brussels before Council working group or 
Commission committee meetings (ibid.). Once the pilot had elaborated a compromise, it 
was formalised in the DEA (Directorate for European Affairs). A similar situation arose 
in the case of the Flood Risk Management Directive (Interview F VMM, 18/05/2009). 
Similarly, Deforche and Bursens found that in cases that fell into exclusive regional 
competence, such as agricultural policy, the coordination was mainly interregional and 
started at the level of officials (2006: 35) 
At the implementation stage, cooperation between regions was nearly exclusively limited 
to European committees and working groups. There were at best one or two meetings of 
the regions on legal matters, but nothing systematic. There was no intention to harmonise 
transposition and implementation in Belgium, other than for those parts that had to be 
coordinated due to EU reporting requirements (Ibid.). 
On the whole, the informal process of coordination confirms the strength of the Belgian 
regions in domestic European policy-making in policy areas that fall under their 
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exclusive competences. The formal coordination in the DEA confers equal importance 
upon each government, regional or federal, through the consensus requirement. However, 
just as in the case of the German Bundesrat, the formal mechanisms often only serve to 
formalise agreements that have already been reached. Thus, in the case of the Bathing 
Water Directive, the substantive coordination at that level generally involved regional 
experts only. As a result, the federal level played a minor role in the formulation of the 
Belgian position. One could thus argue that the regions are even more influential because 
of the informal mechanisms than they are in the official ones, as they can effectively 
relegate the federal level to the role of arbiter. 
While the regions remained in control, they were also forced to cooperate closely with 
one another, confirming the hypothesis and previous research by Beyers and Bursens 
(2006). At the same time, there was little cooperation between the Belgian regions before 
the European initiative or outside international fora, despite 25 years of European 
legislation on bathing water. Similarly, the low level of coordination for implementation 
and transposition purposes confirms that cooperation is motivated by necessity and not a 
change in attitudes. 
 
UK 
In the UK, while the MoU only foresees the JMCs as co-ordination mechanisms, they are 
not the principal means of coordination. On the political level, concrete coordination on 
European legislative projects mainly happens through ministerial write-arounds before 
major events that provide the relevant devolved ministers with updates and allow the 
devolved executives to state their views. Even in the case of conflict, coordination via 
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phone or bilateral meetings between ministers are the norm (Cairney, 2006; Lynch, 2001: 
151-3).  
In the case of the Bathing Water Directive, the Scottish administration received 
information on EU developments from DEFRA, drafted the Scottish position and sent it 
on to DEFRA (Interviews Water, Air, Soils and Flooding Division of the Scottish 
Government 6/05/2009; SEPA, 7/08/2009). On the political level, there were write-
arounds before every major Council meeting (Interview former official of DEFRA, 
7/07/2009). Most of the internal coordination took place at the administrative level 
through a mixture of phone calls, emails, meetings and video-conferences. A policy lead 
group met between once and three times a year, depending on the phase of the 
negotiations (Interviews Water, Air, Soils and Flooding Division of the Scottish 
Government 6/05/2009; SEPA, 7/08/2009; cf. Högenauer 2012: 202-6; Carter and 
McLeod 2005: 72). 
The Bathing Water Directive was transposed separately by Scotland under its devolved 
powers. There was no formal coordination between transposition laws in different parts 
of the UK to the extent that it takes place in Germany or Austria. However, there were 
regular meetings between all four administrations, about three to four times a year, for the 
purpose of information exchange (Interviews former official of the Water, Air, Soils and 
Flooding Division of the Scottish Government, 24/06/2009; Water, Air, Soils and 
Flooding Division of the Scottish Government 6/05/2009; former official of DEFRA, 
7/07/2009). 
Overall, the exchanges were often ad hoc and rarely took place in regular working 
groups. Also, the devolved administrations did not coordinate their positions prior to 
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negotiations with the central departments. In the absence of a joint representative or a 
common position, the UK thus experiences the lowest cooperation effect, which further 
strengthens the role of the central state. 
The literature on Scotland’s engagement in European policy-making explains the bilateral 
nature of intergovernmental relations by pointing towards three factors (Swenden, 2009: 
222; Trench, 2008: 106). First of all, the uneven nature of devolution means that the 
devolved governments are often affected to different degrees. Secondly, the fact that the 
UK government still represents England means that even a common position of the three 
devolved governments would only represent about 15 percent of the population (Hazell, 
2000: 269-71). Finally, a lack of common borders means that cooperation between 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is unlikely to be triggered by cross-border issues. 
Reports on how well this informal system of coordination works differ. Bulmer et al 
argue that the devolved administrations have become relatively powerful players 
(Bulmer, Burch, Hogwood, & Scott, 2006). Yet, the leaked Aron report highlights 
problems such as the flow of information and the level of access to European actors 
granted to Scottish officials, which highlight the relative powerlessness of Scotland (Aron 
2006). Also Reid and Ruiz-Rico Ruiz emphasise the subordination of the Scottish 
government to the UK government in EU affairs (Reid & Ruiz-Rico Ruiz, 2003). 
According to them, the amount of EU legislation in environmental affairs combined with 
the low level of Scottish influence over the UK position even risks undermining the 
devolution settlement (223). 
 
The Bigger Picture: Formal Rights Matter 
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The empirical analysis of the four cases shows three things. Firstly, the formal rules on 
domestic European policy-making all either match the usual cooperative tendencies of 
the member states or increase them. As the EU requires member states to present a single 
national position and as all federal and quasi-federal states allow their regional 
governments to participate in the formulation of the national position, the different actors 
are necessarily brought together. In general, the formal rules mirror the situation in 
domestic policy-making: cooperative federal states empower their regions collectively 
and encourage them to adopt joint positions (Germany, Austria); dual states empower 
their regions individually with consultation (UK) or veto rights (Belgium). Especially, in 
the case of dual states, this represents an increase in cooperation compared to domestic 
policy-making The coordination hypothesis is thus confirmed.  
Secondly, in all member states, this goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the 
central executive. In Belgium, the central government is represented in fora that debate 
policies that fall under exclusive regional competences. In Germany and Austria, the 
regions can only adopt binding positions if the policy area is either exclusively or 
primarily their competence, and even then the national government can avoid compliance 
under certain conditions. In the UK, the devolved executives have only consultative 
rights even in policy areas that otherwise fall under their exclusive competence. The 
centralization hypothesis is thus also confirmed. 
However, while an analysis of the formal mechanisms of coordination thus suggests that 
Europeanization leads to convergence around cooperation and centralization, the picture 
becomes more nuanced once we focus on horizontal cooperation between regions and 
once the actual informal and often highly institutionalized practices of actors are taken 
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into account. Thus, in Belgium and Germany horizontal cooperation is high, whereas in 
the UK and – in many cases – in Austria it is low. This finding is intriguing as it 
transcends the dual-cooperative divide. There are also differences between Belgium, 
where horizontal cooperation is high but only during the decision-making phase, and 
Germany, where it is more sustained. Finally, in practice, the centralization effect seems 
to be minimal in Belgium, as the national position is de facto agreed between affected 
regions. Thus, the logic of formal mechanisms is in some cases changed by informal 
practices. In Germany, informal horizontal cooperation supports formal rules on 
cooperation and in the UK no horizontal cooperation is required and none happens. But 
in Belgium the central government loses influence due to informal practices and in 
Austria horizontal cooperation is often limited, whereas the formal rules foresee 
coordination between the central government and the regions collectively. 
Europeanization thus turns the dual/cooperative logic on its head in the case of Austria 
and Belgium (cf. Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 here 
Thus, the third finding is that the pattern of differences between the countries suggests 
that what kind of informal processes emerge is shaped by the underlying incentive 
structure provided by formal rules. As stipulated by the second hypothesis, incentives and 
barriers are particularly relevant, i.e. the extent to which the collective or individual 
regional position(s) can influence the national position as a whole and factors that impede 
collective influence. 
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The formal provisions for the coordination of the German national position state that the 
regions agree on a collective position in the Bundesrat which then has to be taken into 
account by the federal government. When the Länder competences are affected in 
important ways, the procedure thus means that the Länder position is collective and 
influential. The barriers to reaching a collective position are low in that majority voting 
can be used. In the absence of further informal arrangements, this procedure would 
produce relatively rigid outcomes and most likely lead to internal conflict, as it does not 
foresee a genuine mechanism of negotiation between the federal government and the 
Länder. As a result, an array of informal but well-established practices have evolved that 
include both Länder officials and federal experts and that allow the different levels to 
take the other’s position in to account at an early stage. It also facilitates the search for a 
solution that is viable for all Länder. 
In spite of similarities at first sight, the formal provisions create different incentives in 
Austria. In areas of exclusive regional competence, the Austrian system also foresees a 
collective regional position which has considerable influence over the national position 
(Kovziridze, 2002: 147). Here, the basic dynamics are very similar to the German system. 
However, there are only few exclusively regional competences and thus in the vast 
majority of cases even a unified Länder position would only be consultative. In those 
cases, the Länder have no incentive to undergo the additional effort of reaching a 
common position. In addition, consensus between nine Länder constitutes a high barrier 
to the formulation of a joint position. As a result, the option of a unified position is rarely 
used. The Belgian system gives regions a large amount of influence over the national 
position by giving them a veto right in areas of exclusive regional competence. While this 
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may appear to give individual positions great influence, it ultimately emphasizes 
collective decision-making (Beyers, Delreux, & Steensens, 2004). The consensus 
requirement effectively gives each actor “ownership” of the position. Lack of agreement 
due to poor coordination would lead to a Belgian abstention in the Council, i.e. a near 
complete loss of influence on the part of all Belgian actors. Thus, in order to be effective, 
the formal mechanisms require preparation thorough horizontal coordination. The fact 
that there are only three regions means that consensus represents less of a challenge than 
in Austria. At the same time, the fact that this cooperation does not even spill over to the 
implementation stage of a policy shows that it is motivated by necessity rather than a 
change in attitudes. 
Finally, in the UK, domestic European policy-making is dominated by vertical bilateral 
relationships. Both formally and informally the system strongly relies on providing the 
devolved executives with the necessary information and collecting their reactions. The 
central government is not obliged to incorporate these positions. As a collective position 
of the devolved governments would still represent only a small minority of the 
populationof the member state, it would only carry little more weight than individual 
positions.  
Thus, overall, regions tend to make the effort to coordinate their position with other 
regions if their influence under formal provisions is to some extent contingent upon 
successful inter-regional cooperation or can be substantially enhanced through it. They do 
not invest in horizontal coordination if the perceived gains in terms of influence are small 
or non-existent or the efforts required too great. 
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Figure 3 here 
 
Conclusion 
The key element of strategies of interest representation of strong legislative regions tends 
to be their presence in the coordination of the member state position on EU policies. 
However, the there is great variation between member states in the formal rules 
governing this coordination process. Even within the group of federal or quasi-federal 
member states, the picture is one of diversity with regard to formal influence and 
requirements for horizontal coordination. As far as “cooperation” is concerned, the 
formal rules follow roughly the logic of their federal systems: Germany and Austria 
empower their regions as collective actors, while Belgium and the UK empower their 
regions individually, in line with the predominant dual separation of competences. 
However, formal rules only show part of the picture, as the greatest part of the 
coordination process runs, in practice, through informal channels. The channels can be 
highly institutionalized as the working groups in Germany, or relatively ad hoc as 
coordination among experts in the UK, but in both cases substantive agreement is usually 
reached here. But the effect of informal practices creates diversity. Whereas the UK 
system produces low horizontal cooperation, the Belgian system produces high 
cooperation despite the fact that in both countries regions are empowered individually. 
Whereas the German system produces high cooperation in line with its formal rules and 
cooperative nature, cooperation in the Austrian system can be lower than expected when 
the option of a unified position does not exist.  
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Overall, the hypothesis of the introductory article that Europeanization of 
intergovernmental relations leads to greater cooperation has to be treated with caution. 
The only country that sees a noticeable increase in the level of cooperation is Belgium 
(but only during specific periods of time). The cooperation effect in the UK is small. The 
German system uses the same channels that are used for domestic policy-making and the 
Austrian system arguably risks becoming less cooperative. The centralization hypothesis 
of the introductory article applies to three out of four countries, with the exception of 
Belgium where the central government is largely absent from informal cooperation.  
On the other hand, the differences in the informal practices amongst both cooperative and 
dual states raise the question of the logic behind these practices. In this respect, it seems 
that formal rules do indeed matter. Through the extent to which they empower regions 
and the ways in which they empower regions, they create incentives or a lack of 
incentives to cooperate with other regions. In Belgium, the regions have so much 
influence over the national position that they cooperate closely to ensure that there will be 
a position. By contrast, in the UK and Austria, the lack of formal influence attributed to 
collective (or individual) positions means that there is no incentive to make the effort to 
coordinate. Thus the Europeanization of intergovernmental relations in practice is 
strongly shaped by the formal rules that are in place and that make certain types of 
adaptation more or less attractive. They can make regions work together, as in Belgium 
or Germany, or they can reinforce the tendency of regions to work as individuals, as in 
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Figure 1: Formal Aspects of Intergovernmental Relations in EU Affairs 
 
Hard power refers to a situation where regional governments are entitled to a certain amount of impact on the common 
position (e.g. veto rights). Soft power refers to the absence of guaranteed impact, e.g. when there is only an obligation 
to consult the regions.  
Horizontal cooperation is defined as the amount (frequency of meetings/exchanges) of cooperation required between 
regions by formal rules before the national position is reached.  
 42
 
Figure 2: The Impact of Informal Practices on Intergovernmental Cooperation 
 
Unlike in Figure 1, horizontal cooperation refers to the actual amount of cooperation between regions. Similarly, soft 
and hard power are assessed on the basis of how much power regions can exercise in light of their actual behavior. 
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Figure 3: Summary of Factors in the Emergence of Horizontal Cooperation 
 
The main incentive to cooperate is formal power, which can only be exercised if there is a national position, whereby it 
does not matter if it is collective or individual regional influence. The second set of boxes represent the barriers to 
cooperation, for example high barriers for the attainment of a collective position where a collective position is required 
(e.g. unanimity requirements) or the fact that collective positions will still be minority positions (legislative regions in 
the UK).  
 
                                                 
1
 Austria is an exception here. The regions have few legislative powers, so that they are only affected in 
theri implementing powers. 
